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OPINION OF THE COURT
                      
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
The National Taxpayers Union (“NTU”) petitions for review of a decision of the
Department of Health and Human Services Departmental Appeals Board that upheld a
determination by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who found that NTU mailed
correspondence that used “social security” in a manner that violated Section 1140 of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-10. The Appeals Board also affirmed the ALJ’s
imposition of a civil penalty of $274,582 against NTU.  Because we find that Section
1140(a)(1) is neither unconstitutional as-applied, nor unconstitutionally overbroad, and
that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we deny the petition for
review.1
I.   Facts
NTU is a not-for-profit taxpayer advocacy organization.  In 2001, NTU sent
thousands of direct mail pieces to consumers to solicit donations.  The brochures
included language in large, red, bold type that stated, “Official National Survey on Social
Security.”  The brochures also included the statement that it was “commissioned by the
NTU for the Social Security Administration, White House, and Congress of the United
     The District Court ultimately dismissed NTU’s complaint, and the Fourth Circuit2
affirmed. 
      The statute provides for a “civil money penalty not to exceed . . . $5,000” for each3
piece of mail that contains the prohibited language.  42 U.S.C. § 1320b-10(b)(1).
3
States.”  The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) received a complaint, and the
Inspector General of the SSA determined that the mailing violated Section 1140 of the
Social Security Act.  Section 1140 prohibits the use of nineteen phrases, including
“social security,” in a manner that either (1) the writer knows or should know, or  (2) the
reader could reasonably perceive as conveying the false impression of official
endorsement of the material by the SSA or the government.  The Inspector General sent a
cease-and-desist letter to NTU, and NTU responded with an apology.  SSA subsequently
received an additional complaint, and determined that the basis of the new complaint was
a slightly altered version of the same brochure which NTU mailed after the cease-and-
desist letter.  The SSA Inspector General sent another letter to NTU, demanding that
NTU provide written confirmation of its intent to comply with Section 1140 within ten
days.  Instead of complying, NTU filed a lawsuit in United States District Court,
claiming that Section 1140 was unconstitutional.   While the action was pending, NTU2
mailed a third version of the brochure, which SSA also considered misleading and in
violation of Section 1140. 
The SSA Inspector General wrote NTU, stating that it planned to impose a penalty
in the amount of $274,582, or $.50 per offending direct mail piece.   NTU requested a3
     We review NTU’s constitutional claims de novo.  See, e.g., CBS Corp. v. FCC, 5354
F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2008).
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hearing in front of an ALJ, who found that NTU violated both prongs of Section 1140. 
Specifically, the ALJ found that NTU knew that the language used in the brochures
would induce recipients to read it because the language conveyed the false impression
that the SSA authorized the mailing.  Similarly, the ALJ found that recipients could
reasonably interpret the language on the brochure as conveying the false impression that
the SSA authorized the mailing. Finally, the ALJ found that the proposed penalty was
reasonable.  NTU appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Board of the Department
of Health and Human Services, which refused to review the decision, thereby adopting
the ALJ’s decision as final.  NTU petitions this Court for review of the agency’s final
decision.
In its petition for review, NTU asserts several arguments.  First, NTU challenges
the constitutionality of Section 1140, arguing that it violates NTU’s First Amendment
rights as-applied, and that it is facially overbroad.  Second, NTU argues that the
monetary penalty imposed is “criminal in nature” and that it is “excessive” and prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment.  Finally, NTU urges this Court to apply Daubert principles to




NTU first argues that Section 1140 violates the First Amendment as-applied
because such application penalizes the organization’s speech without finding “actual
intent to defraud.”  In other words, according to NTU, government may not limit speech
unless that speech intends to defraud or deceive the reader or listener.  This assertion
requires little analysis, because it is based on an incorrect reading of Vill. of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).  Contrary to NTU’s assertions,
Village of Schaumburg acknowledged that a “direct and substantial limitation on
protected activity” is constitutional if “it serves a sufficiently strong, subordinating
interest.” Id. at 636. Here, the government has a substantial interest in protecting Social
Security recipients from deceptive mailings.  For millions of Americans, Social Security
is a vital, if not their only, source of income.  Mail that appears to be from the SSA
piques beneficiaries’ interest and induces them to read and respond accordingly. 
Congress enacted Section 1140 to protect seniors and other beneficiaries from fraud, and
to ensure that when the SSA sends legitimate mail to beneficiaries, the recipients will
open it and not perceive it as “junk mail.” HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D
CONG.,  REPORT ON DECEPTIVE SOLICITATIONS 5 (Comm. Print 1992).  Section 1140
requires only that charities refrain from using deceptive language when soliciting. 
Therefore, Section 1140 is constitutional as-applied because it serves a “strong,
subordinating interest.”
6 2. Facially Overbroad
Section 1140 regulates two types of conduct.  The first type of conduct relates to
the intentions of the speaker.  This prong states that a speaker cannot use nineteen
phrases, including “social security,” “in a manner which such person knows or should
know would convey . . . the false impression that such item is approved, endorsed or
authorized by” SSA.  42 U.S.C. § 1320b-10(a).  The second type of conduct is objective
with regard to the reader, and prohibits the use of the proscribed phrases “in a manner
which reasonably could be interpreted or construed as conveying the false impression
that such item is approved, endorsed or authorized” by SSA. Id.  Both prongs also cover
communications that convey the false impression that the author has “some connection
with the SSA.”  Id.
This Court has held that it will strike down a regulation of speech on its face “if its
prohibitions are sufficiently overbroad–that is, if it reaches too much expression that is
protected by the Constitution.” DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 314 (3d Cir.
2008).  In other words, this Court must find that the very existence of the regulation at
issue “will inhibit free expression to a substantial extent.” Id. (quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246-44
(2002) (invalidating the Child Pornography Prevention Act as facially overbroad because
the statute reached a “substantial” amount of protected speech, such as speech that neither
appealed to the prurient interest nor was patently offensive, including speech that had
7serious “literary, artistic, political, and scientific value”); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (“[T]he overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”); 181
South Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The overbreadth claimant bears
the burden of demonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact, that
substantial overbreadth exists.”).
In United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008), the Supreme Court implied
that it disfavors facial challenges, preferring to review circumstances under which the
challenged statute actually infringes protected speech.  The Court noted that the
overbreadth doctrine tends “to summon forth an endless stream of fanciful hypotheticals”
that may potentially implicate the infringement of protected speech.  Id. at 1843.  The
Court further stated that the “‘mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible
applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth
challenge.’” Id. at 1844 (quoting Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)). The Court described hypothetical scenarios
discussed at oral argument, and noted that if those situations came to pass, the affected
parties could bring an as-applied challenge. Id.; see also Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (“Facial challenges are
disfavored for several reasons.  Claims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation. . . .
Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that
8courts should not . . . formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”).  
As previously discussed, the first prong of Section 1140 prohibits the use of
words such as “social security” in a manner that the speaker “knows or should know
would convey” the false impression of government approval or endorsement.   Like other
forms of public deception, fraudulent charitable solicitation is unprotected speech.
Illinois v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 611-12 (2003).  Therefore, the 
prong of Section 1140 that contains the “knowing” standard is not unconstitutionally
overbroad.  Likewise, the First Amendment does not protect a speaker who uses the
prohibited language in such a way that he or she “should know” that the message will
mislead or deceive the reader.
The second part of Section 1140 requires closer analysis because it does not
require that the speaker “know” or “should know” that the language could mislead the
reader.  Rather, the second prong of the statute prohibits the use of the language in such a
way that the reader could reasonably interpret as conveying governmental endorsement. 
Because this prong does not have a scienter requirement for the speaker, it could possibly
reach some protected speech. However, it is wholly unclear that such non-deceptive
speech reaches a “substantial” amount of protected speech.  NTU has failed to provide
any significant examples of protected speech falling under the statute and its counsel
essentially disavowed the overbreadth claim at oral argument.  Given the lack of
      An appellate court reviews the question of whether a fine is constitutionally5
excessive under a de novo standard. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337 n.10
(1998).
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evidence of the second prong’s “substantial” burden on protected speech, we find that
the objective prong of Section 1140 is not overbroad. 
We note that the Fourth Circuit has also examined a similar facial challenge to
Section 1140 in United Seniors Ass’n, Inc. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 423 F.3d 397, 406-07
(4th Cir. 2005).  As in this case, the Fourth Circuit held that, while the objective prong of
Section 1140 could reach some protected speech, any such speech constituted, “at most, a
minuscule portion of the speech reached by the statute.”  Id. at 407.  
For these reasons, we reject NTU’s facial challenge.
B. Monetary Fine5
NTU next challenges the penalty imposed by the ALJ, arguing that it is criminal in
nature and “excessive” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In Myrie v. Comm’r, N.J. Dept. of Corr., this Court examined the issue of whether
a surcharge at a prison commissary was civil or criminal in nature, and whether the
surcharge was excessive.  This Court explained that the first step in such an inquiry is to
determine whether the legislature, “‘in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated
either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.’”  267 F.3d 251, 256
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)). This inquiry is
clear, because Section 1040 expressly permits a “civil money penalty” for violation of the
10
statute.  42 U.S.C. § 1320b-10(b) (emphasis added).  
Under Myrie, the Court next examines whether the “statutory scheme [i]s so
punitive either in purpose or effect . . . as to ‘transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a
civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’” Myrie, 267 F.3d at 256 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S.
at 99-100) (internal citations omitted). This inquiry requires the Court to apply the seven
criteria identified in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
These criteria include
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into
play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned 
. . . .
Id.
Applying these criteria to NTU’s penalty of $.50 per unit that violated Section
1140, we conclude that the criteria do not support NTU’s contention that the penalty is
criminal in nature.  First, NTU concedes that the penalty does not involve an “affirmative
disability or restraint.”  (App. Br. at 32.)  Second, the Supreme Court has stated that
monetary penalties have not “historically been viewed as punishment.”  Hudson, 522
U.S. at 104.  Next, as discussed in Section II.A.2., supra, a violation of Section 1140
does not necessarily require a finding of scienter.  Although Section 1140’s monetary
penalty likely promotes the traditional ends of punishment, retribution and deterrence, to
11
some degree, that alone is not enough to characterize the penalty as penal in nature,
rather than civil.  See id. at 105 (“[T]he mere presence of [deterrence] is insufficient to
render a sanction criminal, as deterrence may serve civil as well as criminal goals.”)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In fact, one of the alternative purposes of
the sanction is to reimburse the Social Security Trust Fund for the cost of policing
deceptive practices.  STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., REPORT
ON DECEPTIVE SOLICITATIONS, at 7 (Comm. Print 1992). In addition, Section 1140 is not
consistent with criminal behavior, because a civil penalty reaches negligent conduct,
whereas actual fraud is required for a crime. With regard to “whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,” this Court has
interpreted this inquiry to ask “whether an asserted ‘sanction’ may be reasonably
regarded as having a purpose other than punishment.”  Myrie, 267 F.3d at 261.  As
previously noted, the legislative history demonstrates that aside from punishment, there
are the additional goals of deterrence, as well as funding the cost of enforcement of
Section 1140.  STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., REPORT ON
DECEPTIVE SOLICITATIONS, at 9 (Comm. Print 1992).  Finally, the fine at issue is not
“excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.”  When compared to the cost to
the government to enforce Section 1140, the $.50 per unit fine is not excessive. 
Moreover, it is far less than the maximum fine of $5,000 per violation that the statute
permits.  
     This Court will defer to fact determinations by the agency “if supported by substantial6
evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  42 U.S.C.  § 1320a-7a(e) (incorporated
by reference in 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-10(c)(1)).
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Likewise, we find NTU’s contention that the fine violates the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment meritless.  To violate the Excessive Fines Clause, the
fine must be both “excessive” and a “fine.”  Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Facility,
221 F.3d 410, 420 (3d Cir. 2000).  For the reasons noted above, the penalty at issue is
neither  “excessive” nor a “fine,” which more commonly refers to a penalty for a criminal
offense.  Id. (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 265 (1989)).
C. Expert Testimony6
NTU asks this Court to endorse the application of Daubert to administrative
proceedings and to strike the testimony of Professor William Arnold, the expert who
testified for the government before the ALJ.  Daubert sets forth rules for determining
whether expert witnesses who testify in federal trials are reliable and relevant as required
by the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993).  Here, NTU argues that Professor Arnold’s testimony was “sloppy and
unscientific” and should have been excluded from the administrative hearing under
Daubert. However, neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor Daubert apply to
administrative hearings.  See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 498.217(b) (“[T]he ALJ will not be
bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence, but may be guided by them in ruling on the
13
admissibility of evidence.” (emphasis added)); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218
n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that Daubert does not govern the admissibility of
evidence before an ALJ).  But see Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2004)
(applying the “spirit of Daubert” to administrative proceedings).
We find NTU’s arguments without merit.  Not only did the ALJ explain the
Professor’s extensive credentials in her opinion, but she conceded that she did not rely on
his testimony in reaching her decision.  Specifically, the ALJ noted that “much of
Professor Arnold’s testimony simply states the obvious. Interpreting the plain meaning of
the language on such blatantly deceptive mailers does not require great expertise.”  (App.
at 17 n.9.)  Even without considering the testimony of Professor Arnold, we find that
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny NTU’s petition.  
